NGÔ THẾ VINH for Viet Ecology Foundation

If the Xayaburi Dam’s construction cannot be postponed for at least a decade, it would be the first domino to fall and open the door for the building of a host of dams downstream. Their immediate, devastating and long lasting impacts on the entire ecosystem of the Mekong and Mekong Delta will not be easily determined.

THE HISTORY OF DAMS DOWNSTREAM THE MEKONG

Since the 1940’s, the potentials for hydroelectric production of the Mekong have attracted the intense attention of American dam builders. In the midst of the cold war, in 1957, the Mekong River Committee was established under the auspices of the United Nations. It maintained a permanent office in Bangkok and consisted of four member nations: Cambodia, Laos, Thailand and Vietnam. At that early stage, the Committee had adopted a comprehensive development plan to improve the lives of all the inhabitants in the Basin including the building of a series of hydroelectric dams downstream the river. Even though half of the Mekong’s current meanders through Yunnan Province, China at that time was a closed society which went undetected on the radar screen of the world.

For over thirty years the Vietnam War spread its tentacles to the three countries of Indochina. Consequently, the building of large hydroelectric dams downstream the Mekong current and other development projects had to be put on hold allowing the Mekong to retain her pristine state for some more time.

On April 5, 1995 the Mekong River Commission which was the reincarnation of the defunct Mekong River Committee met in Chiang Rai, Thailand. During that meeting, the Vietnamese Foreign Minister Mr. Nguyễn Mạnh Cầm signed “The Agreement on the Cooperation for the Sustainable Development of the Mekong River Basin”. [9]

A fundamental modification was adopted by the Commission: It revoked the veto power the Mekong River Committee gave to its members. More than a decade ago, this author had ventured the observation that this Commission is only a “poor and downgraded version” of the former Mekong River Committee.[10]

In subsequent years, the French and Canadian consultants breathed new life into the dam projects that were under consideration by the Mekong River Committee. Their recommendations appeared in the publications issued by the Commission’s Secretariat in 1994. However, they were all shelved in consideration of their high costs as well as extensive impacts on the ecology and their direct effects on the inhabitants along the Mekong’s current.

Beginning in 2006; companies from Malaysia, Thailand, and China were given the green light to carry out feasibility studies for the “run-of-river” dams on the Lower Mekong. Below is the listing of the eleven dams in geographical order from north to south:

1. Pak Beng Dam, Laos 1,320 MW; project sponsors: Chinese company Datang International Power Generation Co. and Laotian government.

2. Luang Prabang Dam, Laos 1,410 MW; project sponsors: Vietnamese company Petrovietnam Power Co. and Laotian government.

3. Xayaburi Dam, Laos, 1.260 MW, Xayaburi Province, Laos; project sponsors: Thai company Ch. Karnchang and Laotian government.

4. Pak Lay Dam, Laos, 1,320 MW Xayaburi Province, Laos; project sponsor: Chinese company Sinohydro Co. June, 2007 to carry out the feasibility studies.

5. Xanakham Dam, Laos, 1,000MW; project sponsor: Chinese company Datang International Power Generation Co

6 . Pak Cho Dam, Lao-Thai borders, 1,079 MW

7. Ban Koum Dam, Lao-Thai borders, 2,230 MW, Ubon Ratchathani Province; project sponsors: Italian-Thai Development Co., Ltd and Asia Corp Holdings Ltd. and Laotian government.

8. Lat Sua Dam, Laos, 800 MW; project sponsors: Thai companies Charoen Energy and Water Asia Co. Ltd., and Laotian government.

9. Don Sahong Dam, 360 MW, Champasak Provimce, Laos; project sponsor: Malaysian company Mega First Berhad Co.

10. Stung Treng Dam, Cambodia, 980 MW; project sponsor: Russian government.

11. Sambor Dam, Cambodia; project sponsor: Chinese company China Southern Power Grid Co. (CSPG).

Beijing is implementing its plan to build 14 dams on the Upper Mekong in Yunnan Province. Currently, it also has a hand in the building of four additional ones in the Lower Mekong. The Chinese company Datang International Power Generation Co is involved in the construction of the Myanmar’s Myitsone Dam (6,000 MW), on the Irrawaddy. This is the largest and most controversial of all the dam projects in Southeast Asia.

Motivated by short-term interest, Vietnam is sponsoring the Luang Prabang Dam Project (1,410 MW) which is larger than the Xayaburi Dam. [1]

XAYABURI – THE FIRST DAM

This is the first dam to be built on the Mekong’s main current, 350 km to the north of Vientiane, 770 km south of Jinhong in the series of dams in the Yunnan Cascades of China and 150km south of Luang Prabang. It ranks among the 300 largest dams of the world.

The vital statistics of this dam are as follows: 830 m wide, 49 m tall, 49km2 in area, two fish passes, and a navigation lock. Its construction costs are reported at US$ 3.5 billion with a projected output of 1,260MW. The expected date of operation is set for 2019 when 95% of the generated electricity will be diverted to the Thai city of Loei through a power grid network extending over a distance of 200km. The prospects for the Xayaburi dam to operate in the long run still remains a big question mark because the large volume of alluvia that will be retained by the dam can quickly fill its reservoir. Below is the schedule for implementation of the project:

May, 2007: the Laotian government signed the contract with the Thai company Ch. Karnchang to build the Xayaburi Dam.

November, 2008: the company AF Calenco of Switzerland started the feasibility study of the dam in collaboration with Thai consultants.

February, 2010: the Environmental Impact Assessment (EIA) was submitted to the Lao government.

July, 2010: the Lao government officially signed the agreement to sell the power generated by the Xayaburi Dam to Thailand with the Electricity Generating Authority of Thailand (EGAT).

April, 2011: the Joint Committee of the Mekong River Commission (MRC/JC) issued a press release that the MRC member countries had not reached a common agreement to start the implementation of the Xayaburi Project. [8]

June, 2011: the Laotian government unilaterally gave the “green light” to the company Ch. Karnchang of Thailand to start the project giving rise to a crisis of confidence among the member countries in the regional attempt to conserve the Mekong’s environment.

Even though the 1995 Convention of the Mekong River Commission (MRC) revoked the veto power of the member countries (that was recognized by the defunct Mekong River Committee), all projects involving the Mekong must go through these three PNPCA stages: (1) Procedures of Notification, (2) Prior Consultation, (3) Agreement. It can be said that the Xayaburi is the very first project to undergo the regional decision-making process of the PNPCA.

Probably, we should pause at this point to review the conventions and time frame applied to each of the three steps in the PNCPA process as defined in the 1995 Convention of the Mekong River Commission: (1) Procedures for Notification (PN) the Mekong River Commission was officially advised by the Laotian government of the Xayaburi Dam Project since September of 2010. (2) Prior Consultation (PC) as specified by the article 5.5.1 the time frame allotted to the Prior Consultation step is six months counting from the day the Notification is received. However, in case a consensus cannot be reached by the member countries, article 5.5.2 allows for the Joint Committee of the Mekong River Commission to extend this six month period.

The Lao government holds to the opinion that there is no certainty for the trans-boundary impacts of the Xayaburi Dam on the countries downstream to ever take place. Consequently, it would neither be practical nor necessary to grant an extension of the Prior Consultation period. Moreover, even if we prolong the time for additional consultation we cannot guarantee all the concerns raised by the member countries would be addressed.

The head of the Lao delegation, Mr. Viraphonh Viravong, stated: “We appreciate all comments, but we will consider to accommodate all concerns”. He went on to give the assurance that all building guidelines stipulated by the Mekong River Commission’s Secretariat would be observed. In addition, his government would also give top priority to the implementation of international criteria to minimize the nefarious impacts on all aspects of the project be it waterway transportation, fish migration, alluvium deposits, water quality, water ecology or even dam safety at acceptable levels.

However, as far as the other member countries like Vietnam, Cambodia, and Thailand are concerned, they still harbor some reservations about the technical drawbacks of the project. They do not feel fully reassured about the assessments of the project’s impacts on the ecology and the lives of the inhabitants of the Basin. Therefore, they believe it is imperative to conduct further consultations with the affected population.

According to the Vietnamese delegation, there exists a need to perform a satisfactory assessment of the trans-boundary and accumulative impacts on the region downstream the river in particular the Mekong Delta. The six month period is not sufficient for the nations along the river current to conduct comprehensive studies to evaluate the accumulative impacts the Xayaburi Dam may cause. Vietnam proposes a moratorium of at least ten years for all dam projects in the Lower Mekong.

As for the Cambodian delegation, it argues that more time is needed for a meaningful and effective dialogue between the member countries and affected population during the Prior Consultation stage. Besides emphasizing the necessity to complete the studies and evaluations of the far-reaching impacts of the Xayaburi Dam on the environment, this delegation introduces the quite novel idea of “sharing” the benefits derived from the dams to set up “social funds” to pay for the conservation of the environment in the affected nations.

Despite the fact that, along with Laos, Thailand benefits greatly from the electricity generated by the Xayaburi Dam, this nation recognizes that the dam plays a major role in the economic development of Laos. Furthermore, the Thai delegation also acknowledges that the problem of ecological degradation resulting in flooding and loss of fishing revenues must be reckoned with because it affects the lives of the inhabitants along the Mekong’s current. Jatuporn Buruspat, Director General of the Thai Department of Water Resources, expresses his empathy with the Thai citizens with these words: “Therefore, we would like to see that public views and concerns are well taken into consideration,” [8]

The Xayaburi Project is the first of the twelve to be implemented in the Lower Mekong and also the first outside of China. Preliminary assessments show that over 200,000 individuals will be directly affected by the dam including the 2,100 villagers who will face forced relocation because their homes are located directly at the construction site. And there are other millions of Cambodians, Lao, and Vietnamese who will also suffer as they depend on the water and fish of the Mekong for their existence.

In the face of uncertainties and those evident losses, the question that comes to mind is: who are the promoting forces behind the implementation of the Xayaburi Project? Who else but the Thai capitalists and dam building companies! The financial players are represented by four big banks: Kasikorn Bank, Bangkok Bank, Krung Thai Bank and Siam Commercial Bank. The dam company is Thai Construction Company Ch. Karnchang. According to plan, 95% of the generated power will be diverted to Thailand and sold to the Electricity Generating Authority of Thailand (EGAT).

SAVE THE MEKONG AND THE PETITIONS

March, 2011: the most compelling petition was sent by the organization SavetheMekong.org to the Prime Ministers of Laos and Thailand with the request to cancel not to postpone the Xayaburi Project. The reasons cited for the request are: the devastation of the region’s ecology and the impacts caused by the dam will represent permanent losses to the life sources of the local population as well as to the Mekong, one of the most precious rivers of this planet, itself.

With over 1,000 species, the fish source of the Mekong ranks second only to that of the Amazon and the Xayaburi Dam will put an end to the migration of more than 23 fish species. It also threatens to bring about the extinction of 41 fish species including the Pla Beuks or Mekong Giant Catfish and the Irrawaddy Dolphins considered the flagship species that is used as an indicator of the sound state of the Mekong’s eco-system.

Ame Trandem, Southeast Asia Program Director, of the International Rivers Network shared the same view: “If the Xayaburi Dam is built it would open the floodgates to other mainstream dams, which would irreversibly alter the entire river ecosystem.” [4]

April of 2011: on account of the widespread opposition displayed by the inhabitants of the Lower Mekong and local as well as international environmental organizations, the governments in the region had to postpone the decision to build the Xayaburi Dam. Unfortunately, with the tacit approval of the Lao government, the Thai dam building company is still quietly proceeding with its works on the project.
The proof is just recently (09/19/2011), a reporter of the Bangkok Post reported that on a trip to the Xayaburi construction site he saw with his own eyes that all the heavy equipments including backhoes were still being used in the building of the almost completed (over 90%) road leading to the dam site.

Viraphonh Viravong, Director General of the Laotian Department of Electricity tries his best to explain away this discrepancy in if not blatant violation of the official decision: “It goes without saying that the road will only be used after the Xayaburi project is given the go ahead again. Failing that, all facilities will revert to the use of the local authorities providing its officials with easy access to the remote villages.” [3]

A BIASED ENVIRONMENTAL IMPACT ASSESSMENT

Not long ago, in May of 2011, the Laotian government hired another Swiss company named Poyry Energy AG to conclude “in three months” an Environmental Impact Assessment (EIA) of the Xayaburi Dam. It went through this motion to satisfy a requirement of the Mekong River Commission paving the way for a decision at the “regional level” on whether to proceed with the project or not at the end of this year. The fate of the Xayaburi Dam will be known at a three-day conference of the Mekong River Commission in Siem Rap, Cambodia, on the 7th thru 9th of December of this year.

In the short span of three months, paying no attention to the innumerable uncertainties and unanswered questions facing it, Poyry came to the incomprehensible conclusion that the harmful impacts of the dam on the populations of Laos and the neighboring countries were negligible and Laos could go ahead with the project.

Poyry claims to be a global consulting and engineering company offering the highest standards in problem solving with extensive know-how in the fields of energy, industry, city planning, water, and ecology. The company boasts a workforce of 7,000 experts and a network of offices in over 50 countries. Poyry’s stocks were valued at 682 million Euros in 2010.

The Lao government chose Poyry on the strength of its records of past works with the dam projects in the Lower Mekong. This company has been maintaining close business ties with the dam building company Ch. Karnchang of Thailand in the construction of the Nam Ngum-2 Dam. Therefore, it is easy to understand why Poyry constantly gives “favorable assessments” to its long-time business partner in the face of evidences to the contrary. [4]

Nam Ngum-2 (615MW) is the second dam built, 35 km upstream from the Nam Ngum-1, on the Nam Ngum River, a tributary of the Mekong. Poyry also did the feasibility study as well as the Environmental Impact Assessment for the Nam Ngum-2 Dam. Its total electricity output will be exported to the Electricity Generating Authority of Thailand (EGAT).

The Nam Ngum-1 Dam was completed in 1971 making Laos the first country to possess a hydroelectric dam in the Mekong Basin in the midst of the Vietnam War.

Four decades after the construction of the Nam Ngum-1 Dam, Laos still remains an underdeveloped and the poorest nation in the region. With a long-term strategy of becoming the “Kuwait of hydro-power of Southeast Asia” Laos is building “pocket” hydroelectric dams on its many small rivers to produce electricity for export as well as domestic consumption. Vietnam has constructed the Yali hydroelectric dams on the Sesan River. The regrettable thing is that many of the rivers in those countries are tributaries that feed their waters to the Mekong’s main current.

Nam Viyaketh, Minister of Industry and Commerce of the Laotian government, declared: “If all sources of energy can be developed, Lao can become a battery of Southeast Asia, we can sell our energy to our neighbors. Laos can be rich.” [11] But what would happen to the Mother River, Mae Nam Khong, and to the lives of the Lao? That question still remains to be answered.

XAYABURI AND THE DOMINO EFFECT

The Domino Effect denotes a chain reaction that is started by an initial event that repeats itself in a linear sequence. An example of it is a row of standing dominoes which starts to fall one after another starting with the first one in the row. The process will continue until the last domino in the row collapses.

The Xayaburi Dam will be the first domino to fall if its construction cannot be postponed for at least a decade (until 2020) as advised by the Mekong River Commission. If that goal cannot be achieved then there would be an onrush to build dams downstream the river and the ensuing impacts on the ecosystem of the Mekong and Mekong Delta would be difficult to foretell.

WHAT CAN BE DONE IN THE NEXT DECADE (2010-2020)?

One year has already gone by since the day the Mekong River Commission issued its recommendations on the Strategic Environmental Assessment in 2010 and called for a moratorium on dam constructions during the next decade to allow for additional research and studies. In his press release of April 14, 2011, Dr Lê Đức Trung, Head of the Vietnamese Delegation, officially called for the suspension of the building of the Xayaburi and other dams as he emphasized that “The deferment should be positively seen as a way to provide much-needed time for riparian Governments to carry out comprehensive and more specific quantitative studies on all possible cumulative impacts” in spite of the Lao Government’s insistence that the PNPCA process had been duly completed.

Those ten years are not a long enough to implement a strategy aiming at conserving the ecology of the Mekong and the Mekong Delta. A decade back, when writing about the University of Cần Thơ, this author had observed that we cannot afford to passively wait for others to provide us with the necessary information as they see fit before we could act. For our own survival, we need to be proactive in our search for the objective information we need. It is imperative for us to keep in our sight a long-term strategy and an army of experts who are not only competent but also devoted to their lines of work.

We also had put forth several suggestions that date back over ten years ago but are still timely and urgent in our present days.

There is presently a pressing need for the University of Cần Thơ which is also known as the “Intellectual Lighthouse” of the Mekong Delta to set up a Mekong River Department to serve as a “think tank” for research, instruction, and center for “gray matter”. The Department’s teaching staff will consist of the university’s regular academic body working hand in hand with experts from the Mekong River Commission, the Mississippi River Commission, and the international experts of the Mekong River Commission (MRC). Those specialists should be invited to teach at the Mekong River Department as visiting professors. The materials used in their lectures will provide invaluable information gathered from actual work experience.

Qualified Vietnamese as well as foreign students from countries of the Basin would be recruited to be trained as engineers in Ecology at the post graduate level. Hand in hand with theoretical teachings, the students would go on field trips at the dams and key sections on the River. Furthermore, they would spend a period of on-the-job training at the Mekong River Commission. To graduate they must complete a small thesis on the different aspects of the conservation of the Mekong River’s ecology.

As for the government, it is imperative that a network of “attachés for the ecology” be established at its embassies and consulates in the countries of the region. We currently have military and cultural attachés and the creation of a new position for the ecology would not be too farfetched a solution. The diplomatic locations this author has in mind are: the Vietnamese Consulate in Kunming, Yunnan and the four Vietnamese embassies in Cambodia, Laos, Myanmar and Thailand. These attachés will act as eyes and ears or human observation posts for the Mekong River Department, the Vietnamese National Mekong River Commission, and the Ministry for the Protection of the Ecology.

In an interview on 02/10/2011 with Radio Free Asia (RFA), [13] to answer the question of what the governments in the Lower Mekong must do to conserve the ecology and the livelihood of the inhabitants of the Basin, Engineer Phạm Phan Long of the Viet Ecology Foundation stated that besides putting a halt to the building of the Xayaburi and other dams on the Mekong, there were other measures that the governments in the Lower Mekong could do. They include: establishment of the “Mekong Fund” to finance the conservation of the ecology and the flood or drought relief efforts; reforestation and replanting of the plants; development of agriculture and fisheries; programs to help the population adapt to droughts, and salinization as they have learned to live with the alum and floods; vocational training for economic activities unrelated to those dependent on lakes and rivers. In ten year time, institute researches of hydroelectricity and construction of reservoirs designed for the use of flood and drought control.

These recommendations coincide with the Cambodian Delegation’s suggestion of earmarking part of the revenues from the dams to a “benefits sharing” plan to compensate the inhabitants along the Mekong’s current for the damages and inconveniences they suffer from the dam projects. “The Mekong Fund” will act as an insurance trust for all risks, big or small, emanating from the exploitation of the Mekong be it from the water use or operation of the hydroelectric dams.

An urgent question is addressed to the Mekong River Commission: Isn’t it now high time for us to establish the baseline criteria and scientific parameters to be applied not only to the Xayaburi but all dams during the PNPCA process? Some of them include: (1) guarantee of a minimum flow rate during the dry seasons, (2) guarantee of a flow rate during the rainy seasons so that the Mekong can reverse its course and flow into the Tonle Sap Lake, (3) safeguard the fish population and fish migration, (4) preserve the water quality and alluvium flow in the Mekong Delta. (5) and most importantly a commitment by the member countries to observe those fundamental criteria and the creation of a policing as well as disciplinary authority to enforce the rules and impose sanctions in case of infractions.

Another question is facing the Vietnam National Mekong Committee: how would the PNPCA Process be applied in the case of the Luang Prabang Dam (1,410 MW) financed by Petro Vietnam Power Co. instead of the Xayaburi funded by the company Ch. Karnchang of Thailand. In this author’s opinion, Vietnam is recklessly walking on thin ice and applying double standard in the financing of the Luang Prabang Dam. This country would be hard pressed to offer convincing and satisfactory justifications to support its decision.

NGÔ THẾ VINH
12 – 01 – 2011

Source

REFERENCES:
1/ Mekong – Cửu Long 2011 A Look Forward into the Next Half Century; Ngo The Vinh, Viet Ecology Foundation 01- 11- 2011

http://www.vietecology.org/Article.aspx/Article/63

2/ Illegal Construction on the Xayaburi Forges Ahead; Ame Trandem, International Rivers 08-04- 2011
3/ Bangkok Post Updated on Xayaburi Construction; Bangkok Post Sunday, 09 -18- 2011
4/ Petition to Cancel the Xayaburi Dam. Ame Trandem, Southeast Asia Program Director, International Rivers, 11- 09- 2011 http://salsa.democracyinaction.org/o/2486/p/dia/action/public/?action_KEY=8547
5/ Laos Uses New Report to Greenwash the Xayaburi Dam; Press Release International Rivers, 09- 11- 2011 http://www.internationalrivers.org/en/2011-11-8/laos-uses-new-report-greenwash-xayaburi-dam
6/ Southeast Asian Dam Still a Carbon Source Ten Years Later; Katy Yan, International Rivers 10- 26- 2011 http://www.internationalrivers.org/en/blog/katy-yan/2011-10-26/southeast-asian-dam-still-carbon-emitter-ten-years-later
7/ US Senate Hearing Recognizes Mainstream Dam Threat to Mekong River; International Press Release 09- 24- 2010 http://www.internationalrivers.org/en/2010-9-23/us-senate-congressional-hearing-recognizes-mainstream-dam-threat-mekong-river
8/ Lower Mekong Countries Take Prior Consultationn on Xayaburi Project to Ministerial Level. MRC Vientiane Lao PDR, 04- 19- 2011, http://www.mrcmekong.org/news-and-events/news/lower-mekong-countries-take-prior-consultation-on-xayaburi-project-to-ministerial-level/
9/ Agreement on the Cooperation for the Sustainable Development of the Mekong River Basin, Chiang Rai, Thailand, 04- 05- 1995
10/ Nửa Thế Kỷ 1957-2007 Từ Ủy Ban Sông Mekong Tới Ủy Hội Sông Mekong; Ngô Thế Vinh 06- 2007, Thế Kỷ 21, No. 219, July 2007
11/ Laos Turns to HydroPower to be Asia’s Battery; Jared Ferrie, The Christian Science Monitor, July 2, 2010
12/ Mekong Tipping Point: Hydropower Dams, Human Security and Regional Stability; Richard P. Cronin, Timothy Hamlin; The Henry L. Stimson Center 2010
13/ Lancang-Mekong Initiative; A Foundation for the Long Term Cooperation and Prosperity for China and ASEAN, Pham Phan Long, Feb 2011, http://www.rfa.org/vietnamese/in_depth/How-To-Save-The-Mekong-River-part-2-02102011054706.html?searchterm=None
14/ Viện Đại Học Cần Thơ, Đồng Bằng Sông Cửu Long và Con Sông Mekong; Ngô Thế Vinh, Thế Kỷ 21 06- 2002